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ABSTRACT
I attempt to resolve the question of whether keeping animals as pets 
is akin to slavery by considering the significance of liberty to human 
beings and to nonhuman animals. I distinguish between two senses 
of liberty: preference liberty and autonomous liberty. Preference lib-
erty is the freedom to satisfy the preferences that one in fact has. 
Autonomous liberty is the ability to satisfy the preferences that one 
might have regardless of whether one actually has those preferences. 
Preference liberty has a value for animals, but autonomous liberty is 
meaningless for them. As the core wrong of slavery is the restriction 
of autonomous liberty, I conclude that pet-keeping is not akin to slav-
ery, though in practice it is often morally wrong for other reasons.
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The Polarized Views of Pet-Keeping
The moral defensibility of keeping non-human animals 
(henceforth, “animals”) is a subject that tends to elicit polar-
ized opinions. Among animal rights advocates, it is sometimes 
regarded as a form of exploitation akin to slavery. Many in the 
general public, on the other hand, find this stance laughable in 
light of the supposedly pampered status of most household pets 
compared with wild animals. “My cat isn’t my slave,” goes the 
common jocular rejoinder; “I’m his!” This imagined dilemma 
between pets as pampered or pets as slaves is a false one. Both 
could be true, or neither, because slavery and cruel treatment 
are distinct issues.
All too often, it is supposed that – a few bad owners aside 
– pets have lives of exceptional happiness. Hilary Bok, while 
recognizing that “on occasion, life with pets can go badly 
wrong,” confidently asserts that “domesticated animals such as 
cats and dogs are typically happy living in human households” 
and “For the most part, the interest of pets and their owners 
do not diverge in any serious way” (2011, 769). She regards 
pet-keeping as much less problematic than animal research or 
farming because “Pet owners’ intentions are both generally be-
nign and focused on nonhuman animals as individuals” (2011, 
770). According to Bok, dogs and cats “have much better lives 
with humans than they would in the wild” (2011, 769), though 
David DeGrazia points out that comparing the lives of domes-
tic animals to the lives they would have in the wild makes little 
sense; even a neglected dog is likely better off than a stray sim-
ply because dogs are highly domesticated in a way that makes 
them unsuited for a life in the wild (DeGrazia 2011, 743-44). 
Some authors have rightly called into question the idea that 
pets are generally treated with such a high level of care. In 
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sharp contrast to Bok, Charles Danten regards the relationship 
as disastrous for animals: “I am not making an assertion that 
happy pets do not exist, but if they do, they are few and far 
between. Well-being in a dependent relationship is possible 
only if all of the needs of the dependent animal are met. In 
the framework of captivity, this condition can be fulfilled only 
rarely or partially” (2015, 90). Danten’s view, while very likely 
true of exotic animals, is implausibly pessimistic for highly-
domesticated animals such as dogs, whose adaptation to hu-
man contact and domestic life has been cultivated over millen-
nia. On the other hand, Bok’s utopian view is no less dubious, 
and Danten provides numerous anecdotes from his career as 
a veterinarian to illustrate the selfishness that guides many 
people’s treatment of their pets. Likewise, Bernard Rollin cites 
frivolous “euthanasia,” irresponsible acquisition and abandon-
ment, ignorance of an animal’s needs and nature, and elective 
surgery such as de-clawing and ear-cropping as examples of 
the widespread harms inflicted by pet-keepers on the animals 
under their care (2006, 297-307), and Varner echoes this (2002, 
468-70, 473). Stuart Spencer et al. highlight apparent inconsis-
tencies between what the public condemns about farming (de-
beaking chickens, for instance) and what they tolerate toward 
pets (cropping dogs’ tails, for instance) (2006, 24). Though 
their intention seems to be to present a reductio against these 
objections to industrial farming, it works better as a condemna-
tion and call for reform of pet-keeping practices. In light of the 
widespread disregard for the needs and desires of pets and the 
low priority their interests are given in conflicts with human 
members of the household, the general perception of them as 
too “pampered” to pose real ethical concerns is much too rosy. 
Clearly pet-keeping is highly problematic in common practice, 
contrary to the blithe assertion that pets cannot be slaves be-
cause they are so pampered.
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Granting that pets are not always or often as happy as one 
might like to think, the question remains: what if they were? 
Would ending harmful and irresponsible treatment of pets be 
enough to transform pet-keeping (or companion animal guard-
ianship, as might be a better term for the ideal relationship) into 
a just institution? Not if it is indeed a form of slavery, because 
the deepest wrong of slavery is not in its cruelty. Even the most 
pleasantly-treated human slave suffers a severe violation by be-
ing deprived of liberty. The fact that care and concern may be 
lavished on an animal does not itself prove that the animal is 
not a slave. Perhaps even the most idealized pet-human rela-
tionship is still “benign slavery.” By that term I do not intend to 
endorse any slavery at all as morally permissible, nor to lessen 
the essential wrong of slavery. Instead, I merely use it to desig-
nate a (probably merely hypothetical) state of slavery in which 
the enslaved individual is provided with a pleasant life free of 
significant suffering and want. If pet-keeping is a form of slav-
ery, then no matter how well we treat our pets, the relationship 
by its nature is morally wrong.
Those who assert that pets live a luxurious life in order to 
counter the claim that they are slaves have made two errors: 
first, they have not taken a hard enough look at how pets are 
actually treated in common practice, and second, they have 
failed to realize that being treated kindly and being a slave are 
not mutually exclusive. Those who contend that pet-keeping is 
a form of slavery have made a different error, one that I intend 
to focus on henceforth. I will argue that pet-keeping is not com-
parable to slavery. It may be that the institution ought still to be 
abolished, because of the frequent harm done to pet animals by 
irresponsible pet-keepers, and the difficulty of causing the so-
cial change needed to end this harm. Any wrongfulness of pet-
keeping, however, does not come from a similarity to slavery.
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Criticism and Defenses of Pet-Keeping
Several authors have criticized our relationship with domes-
tic animals by evoking the specter of slavery. Marjorie Spie-
gel’s The Dreaded Comparison is an extended comparison be-
tween human slavery and our treatment of animals, though she 
discusses pets only briefly, with laboratory and farm animals 
occupying most of her concern. “We might look at the relation-
ship between a dog and his master, just one example of what is 
sometimes a modern slave/slave-owner relationship . . . . If a 
dog wishes to do something other than what pleases his master 
. . . he may be beaten or otherwise punished. All independent 
actions are thus discouraged” (Spiegel 1996, 41). Spiegel, how-
ever, notably refers to the dog-human relationship as sometimes 
a slave/slave-owner relationship, which recalls Bok’s argument 
that the relationship can, with the right attitude on the part of 
the pet’s caretaker, be morally acceptable. 
Danten discusses the wrongfulness of pet-keeping more ex-
tensively in his work titled (in English) Slaves of Our Affec-
tion: The Myth of the Happy Pet. Most of it is about the cruelty 
inflicted on pets for the sake of selfishness and convenience 
rather than on the concept of slavery per se, but the appendix 
contains a provocative quotation from James Stirling detail-
ing his observations of slaves in the American South, to which 
Danten has added words parenthetically to show how it can 
easily be adapted to describe our relationships with domestic 
animals. So when Stirling tells us that “the house servant is 
comparatively well off” and benefits from greater affection 
from the master than the plantation hand, Danten reads “pet” 
for “house servant” and “farm animal” for “plantation hand”; 
in other words, while pets may be subject to less severe mis-
treatment, they are no less slaves (2015, 255-56). Again, how-
ever, the focus is on the cruelties inflicted: Danten believes that 
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the life of a pet is only a less severe mistreatment than that of 
the farm animal, and believes that pets that are not mistreated 
at all are rare to nonexistent (Danten 2015; 90, 254).
As previously argued, focusing on the suffering or privation 
inflicted on pets does not entirely address the question, since 
it is at least theoretically possible that a pet could be free from 
significant suffering or privation (including boredom, loneli-
ness, or other emotional harms) and still be a slave. Leslie Ir-
vine offers a typical example of such an argument, stating that 
“...the perpetuation of our pleasure is not sufficient reason to 
enslave other animals” (2004, 5). While acknowledging that a 
welfarist (utilitarian) position would permit pet-keeping if the 
institution were significantly modified, she endorses a deonto-
logical approach drawn from Tom Regan and Gary Francione, 
stating that animals have inherent value and therefore cannot 
be treated as property: “If we recognize the intrinsic value of 
animals’ lives, then it is immoral to keep them for our pleasure, 
regardless of whether we call them companions or pets” (Irvine 
2004; 11, 14). She concludes that although she does not herself 
regard the animals in her household as property, “...outside of 
the household, that is exactly their status. I am free to pamper 
them or ignore them, as long as I am not caught inflicting in-
tentional cruelty” (2004, 14). Francione has made a very simi-
lar argument. The institution of “pet ownership,” according to 
Francione, violates animals’ right not to be treated as things, 
because it considers pets to be property. “You may treat your 
animal companion as a member of your family and accord her 
or him inherent value or the basic right not to be treated as your 
resource. But your treatment of your animal really means that 
you regard your animal property as having more than market 
value; should you change your mind . . . your decision will be 
protected by the law” (Francione 2007, 169).
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While Bok’s view of pets is dubiously rosy, her reply to 
Francione (and, by extension, Irvine) is strong. The fact that 
the law currently treats pets in a certain way does not mean that 
it always must or that we cannot do better then the law requires 
in the meantime. “The problem with our current system, is . . . 
that it gives us rights over nonhuman animals that we arguably 
ought not to have,” according to Bok. “Fortunately, this system 
does not force us to exercise those rights. We can, and should, 
treat our pets in just the same way that we would if the laws 
governing nonhuman animals are exactly as they should be” 
(2011, 776). That society regards pets – and all animals – as 
mere property with no legal rights is true and deplorable, but 
the question of whether pet-keeping is intrinsically and neces-
sarily wrong remains. 
Irvine regards the relationship between human and pet as 
necessarily exploitative, but this seems to rest on the assump-
tion that “keeping animals for our pleasure” must mean “keep-
ing them for our pleasure without regard to their own inter-
ests.” That is the essence of exploitation, but it need not be the 
case in our relationships with companion animals. Just as I can 
maintain friendships because they give me pleasure without 
necessarily treating my friends as mere means for my pleasure, 
I can take pleasure in relationships with animals without neces-
sarily treating them as mere means. Friendships are (or should 
be) mutually beneficial, just as the defenders of pet-keeping 
would argue our relationships with animals can be.
Kristien Hens explicitly rejects the idea that companion ani-
mals, particularly dogs, are slaves on the grounds that the re-
lationship would not be so successful if owners treated them 
as slaves: “Repressive training techniques destroy the dog-hu-
man relationship rather than build it... It is indeed questionable 
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whether the relationship dog-human would have been so suc-
cessful if they were merely man’s tools” (2009, 6). Neverthe-
less, the challenge is not so easily dismissed. Training tech-
niques can be kind, the owner can be loving and caring, and the 
animals may benefit in many ways from the relationship, but 
pets are still under our control. Even if they were granted legal 
protections that distinguish them from property, they would 
still not be free agents. What account, if any, can be offered for 
the legitimacy of such a relationship?
Discussions of the pet-human relationship by authors that 
accept the moral permissibility of such a relationship have of-
ten focused on what duties one has to one’s pets, taking as a 
given that such relationships are (or can be) morally permis-
sible (Burgess-Jackson 1998, Varner 2002). Among those that 
address the question of moral permissibility itself, there are 
three primary approaches. The first is to argue that the cap-
tivity of domestic animals is for their own good because we 
have molded them into creatures who are not capable of living 
“in the wild.” Gary E. Varner writes, “On any plausible ethical 
theory, the keeping of pets who meet the conditions for be-
ing companion animals and domesticated partners is almost 
surely going to be permissible. At a base minimum, dogs to a 
significant degree need to live among humans in order to live 
well...” (2002, 464; cf. Bok 2011, 777). But this fails to note the 
difference between “we need to keep these dogs for their own 
good” and “we should continue to encourage the institution of 
pet-keeping.” A critic of pet-keeping such as Francione or Ir-
vine will argue that we must keep the domestic animals who 
currently exist but ensure no more of them are bred. “As much 
as I enjoy living with dogs,” Francione writes, “were there only 
two dogs remaining in the world, I would not be in favor of 
breeding them” (2007, 170). The goal ought to be to phase out 
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the institution, with the presence of pets in our lives prior to 
that time being a necessary evil. Bok dismisses this as a possi-
bility without argument (2011, 777), but it is not clearly absurd.
The second approach is to say that pet-keeping is justified 
so long as the animal derives benefit from it. Varner says that 
“the keeping of companion animals and domesticated partners 
can be justified to the extent that both keeper and pet genuinely 
benefit from the relationship” (2002, 465). Those holding the 
position that pet-keeping is slavery are unlikely to find this ar-
gument convincing. It is reminiscent of Aristotle, who stated 
that “domestic animals are by nature better than wild ones, 
and it is better for all of them to be ruled by human beings, 
since in this way they secure their preservation” (2016, 627), 
but Aristotle believes the same of the allegedly less-rational 
human beings whom he construed as “natural slaves.” Just as 
a non-rational animal is better off being ruled by a rational 
human being, so it is that “slavery is both advantageous and 
just” for these natural slaves (Aristotle 2016, 627). This com-
parison, though offered in defense of human slavery, now has 
the unintended effect of casting suspicion on arguments that 
justify control over animals on the basis of the benefits they are 
alleged to receive. Spiegel regards them as bad-faith attempts 
to obscure the actual misery of domestic animals, as in the case 
of a factory farm worker who claims the chickens are “happy” 
because they are protected from predators and receive regular 
food, despite the fact that she can plainly see that they live in 
miserable conditions (1996, 75-76). No doubt such claims that 
domestic animals are happy are often unfounded and serve 
only as rationalizations for their use, but let us continue to con-
sider the theoretical possibility that a slave may truly be better 
off, in the sense of having needs and desires met, by entering 
into slavery. Such benign slavery would still be slavery.
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The third approach is to characterize the relationship as 
a sort of contract. Rollin takes such an approach: “One may 
choose to see the human relationship to the dog as involving 
something like a social contract, in which animals give up their 
free, wild, pack nature to live in human society in return for 
care, leadership, and food” (2006, 289). Rollin states that “Ac-
cording to some ethologists... humans have actually developed 
the dog into a creature whose natural pack structure has been 
integrated into human society, with the human master playing 
the traditional role of pack leader. It is hard to imagine a more 
vivid and pervasive example of a social contract...” (2006, 290). 
He claims that this holds for other domestic animals also (2006, 
290).
Clare Palmer offers a convincing criticism of the idea of a 
domestic animal contract with human beings. Palmer identi-
fies four components of a social contract: a transition from one 
state to another (e.g. from a state of nature to a state of culture), 
limitations on some freedoms, free and equal individuals who 
understand and consent to the contract, and benefits to all par-
ties to the contract (1997, 414). Palmer concludes that the rela-
tionship with domestic animals meets the first two criteria but 
the last two are problematic.
The third criterion is a problem because animals cannot un-
derstand the contract, and there is unequal power between the 
contractors (Palmer 1997, 417). She considers different models 
of the social contract that have emerged to resolve the apparent 
lack of a literal historical contract (and the fact that the exis-
tence of such contract may not in any case be binding on the 
descendants of the original contractors). On the tacit consent 
model, certain actions are interpreted as tacit consent to the 
social contract – for instance, willingly deriving benefits from 
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the contract. On the hypothetical consent model, one looks at 
whether someone “would have consented” to the social con-
tract. Neither of these models applies well to animals, because 
the fact that domestication has given animals no viable op-
tion other than the current state of affairs “makes a mockery 
of the idea of either tacit or hypothetical consent” (1997, 421). 
Palmer concludes that “key aspects of the social contract and 
the domesticated animal contract are fundamentally different: 
the animal contract could not be said to be created by equal 
individuals, it is not clearly advantageous to all animals and it 
is dependent either on a controversial idea of tacit consent or 
on an extremely abstract kind of hypothetical consent” (1997, 
421-422).
None of the three approaches adequately respond to the con-
cern that pet-keeping is a form of slavery. In order to determine 
whether this concern is warranted, we must inquire into the 
nature of slavery and its wrongfulness for human beings, and 
then see how or whether that transfers to animals.
Liberty, Autonomy, and Slavery
Slavery clearly involves a limitation of freedom. But the 
term “freedom” encompasses several different concepts, so 
it is important to determine which senses of freedom are in-
volved. First, one might speak of freedom in regard to the 
agent’s internal capacities – in other words, freedom of will. 
Second, one might speak of freedom in terms of how the agent 
is treated by others or affected by outside forces (for instance, 
whether restraints are placed on the agent by others). It is im-
portant to avoid conflating these two senses of freedom, and 
also important to understand their relationship with each other. 
For the sake of precision, various terms have been introduced 
for the varieties of freedom.
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DeGrazia distinguishes between liberty and autonomy. He 
states that “Liberty or freedom of action is the absence of ex-
ternal constraints – such as prison walls or coercive measures 
– that impede one from doing what one wants,” (1996, 204) 
whereas autonomy, following Gerald Dworkin, is “a second-
order capacity to reflect critically upon one’s first-order prefer-
ences and desires, and the ability either to identify with these 
or to change them in light of higher-order preferences and val-
ues” (Dworkin, quoted in DeGrazia 1996, 205). The tempta-
tion might be to regard liberty, so defined, as a more basic and 
bare-bones variety of freedom, and autonomy as a richer and 
more robust freedom. They are not precisely paired concepts, 
however. DeGrazia’s definition of liberty makes it freedom in 
the external sense (absence of limitations), whereas autonomy 
refers to freedom in the internal sense (freedom of will).
Alasdair Cochrane uses the terms “liberty” and “freedom” 
interchangeably, but distinguishes between three senses of lib-
erty. Negative liberty “refers to being free from interference 
and constraints,” positive liberty “refers to an individual’s abil-
ity to control his or her own life: to self-govern and to self-
rule,” and republican liberty “refers to the absence of domina-
tion” (Cochrane 2009, 663). Cochrane states that “whichever 
conception is adopted, most people consider freedom to be an 
absolutely fundamental interest of human beings,” but his own 
assumption that human slavery always violates an interest in 
liberty (2009, 665) paired with his admission that “benevolent” 
slavery may be compatible with negative liberty (2009, 663) 
suggests that he adopts a positive or republican conception of 
“liberty.” Cochrane, like DeGrazia, uses Dworkin’s definition 
of autonomy, interpreting it as “the capacity to frame, revise, 
and pursue one’s own conception of the good” (2009, 665).
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While I will adopt “liberty” to refer to an external variety of 
freedom and “autonomy” to refer to an internal variety, I want 
to introduce further distinctions and clarifications on both sides 
of the fence. In the domain of free will, we should distinguish 
between autonomy in DeGrazia’s sense and what might be 
called freedom of choice. Various authors have used different 
terms for these ideas while retaining the essential distinction. 
Kantians refer to autonomy (in Kant’s terms, Wille) as opposed 
to the power of choice (in Kant’s terms, Willkür). Others have 
characterized both of these concepts as varieties of autonomy. 
Regan refers to the Kantian sense of autonomy, which requires 
the ability to deliberate and reflectively evaluate the merits of 
different actions, and contrasts it with “preference autonomy,” 
which only requires that one have “preferences and have the 
ability to initiate action with a view to satisfying them” (2004, 
84-85). Similarly, Steven Wise distinguishes between “full 
autonomy” (which he identifies with the Kantian conception) 
and “practical autonomy,” which merely requires the ability to 
choose appropriate actions with an aim to satisfying desires 
(2002, 30-32). Andrew Sneddon adopts the terms “deep au-
tonomy” to mean having a life-plan, which “requires reflec-
tion, foresight, self-assessment, sensitivity to values that might 
structure a life, [and] knowledge of the kinds of life one [might] 
pursue,” and “shallow autonomy” to mean uncoerced choice 
(2001, 107). For the sake of simplicity, and to avoid confusion, 
I will reserve “autonomy” to refer to the reflective, end-setting 
variety (Kantian, full, or deep autonomy), and will use “free-
dom of choice” for the other capacity (preference, practical, or 
shallow autonomy).
The term “liberty” conceals another useful distinction. Con-
sider, again, DeGrazia’s definition of liberty: “the absence of 
external constraints – such as prison walls or coercive mea-
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sures – that impede one from doing what one wants.” Cochrane 
correctly notes that it is possible to imagine a slave who is 
not impeded from doing what she wants, especially if “what 
she wants” has been shaped in certain ways (2009, 666). The 
impediment moves from actual to hypothetical. The slave in 
our thought experiment is not prevented from doing what she 
wants, but what she might have wanted. My argument hangs on 
the significance of this distinction. I will therefore revise De-
Grazia’s definition of liberty to distinguish between two kinds 
of liberty. The first I will call “preference liberty”: the absence 
of external constraints that impede one from doing what one 
(in fact) wants. The second I will call “autonomous liberty”: 
the absence of external constraints that impede one from do-
ing what one might have wanted. Preference liberty is valuable 
because it permits the exercise of choice, which allows one to 
pursue (or attempt to pursue) one’s goals. Any creature with 
preferences and the ability to exercise choice will benefit from 
preference liberty. Autonomous liberty is, as the name sug-
gests, only relevant to beings possessing autonomy, because it 
is the ability to reflect on and revise one’s ends that makes such 
a counterfactual meaningful. 
It is generally assumed that normal, adult human beings 
possess autonomy as well as freedom of choice, but nonhu-
man animals (at least of the kinds we normally keep as pets) 
possess only the second of these. “It is highly unlikely that any 
animal is autonomous in the Kantian sense,” according to Re-
gan (2004, 84). Our understanding of animals’ cognitive abili-
ties has advanced considerably since Regan first formulated his 
theory, and they are now credited with much more intelligence 
than in the past, including remarkable problem-solving abili-
ties, in some cases, self-consciousness. Nevertheless, Chris-
tine Korsgaard, in her influential Kantian account of duties to 
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animals, regards animals as non-rational because they are not 
aware of the grounds of their actions, a necessary condition for 
autonomy. She acknowledges that animals exhibit intelligence 
and may even possess a kind of self-consciousness, but main-
tains that autonomy is distinct from these and that, as far as we 
know, only human beings possess it (Korsgaard 2011, 101-3). 
James Rocha takes exception to Korsgaard and makes a case 
that animals may be minimally rational from a Kantian per-
spective, sufficient to warrant the precaution of treating them 
with a “minimal amount of respect,” though he admits that 
“animals are still likely to turn out to have limited rational-
ity” (2015, 327). Most relevantly, he contends that engaging in 
play is proof of animals’ capacity for free end-setting: “play 
involves setting fun for its own sake as an end” (2015, 319). I 
am skeptical about this account; play is undoubtedly fun, but is 
the animal really “setting fun as an end” or simply doing some-
thing naturally satisfying? But even if play could be described 
as free end-setting, this falls well short of the idea of autonomy 
as requiring “reflection, foresight, self-assessment, sensitivity 
to values that might structure a life, knowledge of the kinds of 
life one [might] pursue,” etc.) (Sneddon 2001, 107). 
Whether any animals possess autonomy is an empirical 
question. It may be that a few species do have it, and then my 
argument will not apply to those species. It is likely, however, 
that even if autonomy does exist in animals, it will be limited 
to a few species that are not commonly kept as pets. If, as I am 
supposing, pet animals are not autonomous, only preference 
liberty will be important to them; autonomous liberty will be 
irrelevant. The following story will illustrate this distinction.
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Imagine that a group of rabbits lives in the middle of a large 
forest. The range of these rabbits is quite small; they never 
wander outside a certain clearing in the middle of the forest, 
not because of any artificial pressure but simply because wan-
dering far from their home burrow is not in their nature. Then, 
imagine that, for some reason or another (perhaps the rabbits 
are an endangered species and they need protection from hu-
man interlopers) a fence is built around the perimeter of the 
forest. If the rabbits were to wander to the edge of the forest, 
far from their home territory, they would find themselves con-
fined. But they never do wander so far. They do not have any 
desire to cross it, and never will, so it does not pose an impedi-
ment to the pursuit of their desires. The fence does not infringe 
on the rabbits’ preference liberty.
Now imagine instead that there is a philosopher notorious 
for never leaving the vicinity of his home town. He has never 
had a desire to wander far, and in fact reacts very negatively 
to any suggestion that he ought to travel farther. Then imagine 
that we set up checkpoints on all the roads that he would take 
if he ever were to leave town, with guards instructed never 
to let the philosopher through. That this seems to be entirely 
different from the situation with the rabbits presents a puzzle. 
The philosopher, like the rabbits, is not prevented from doing 
as he wishes, since he does not wish to leave town. So long as 
he stays this course, he will never bump up against the wall we 
have placed around him. It seems that we have not restricted 
his preference liberty either.
One might say, “The difference is that we cannot be certain 
the philosopher will never try to leave. Perhaps he will become 
more open-minded about travel as time goes by.” Then let us 
remove the issue of certainty, and say that we are looking back 
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at the philosopher’s life after his death, and it turns out that he 
indeed never did try to leave town. What harm, what foul, was 
committed by having the checkpoints set up that he never tried 
to cross?
The reply then comes, “But if he had tried to leave he would 
have been prevented.” This concern seems to better address the 
wrongness of our treatment of the philosopher. What happens 
if we say the same of the rabbits? “Yes, the fence was far out-
side the rabbits’ range, but if they had tried to roam much fur-
ther than normal, they would have been stopped by it.” Though 
strictly true, it does not seem to have the same moral character. 
Counterfactuals do not seem as relevant to their situation.
The root of this difference is autonomy. An autonomous be-
ing is capable of choosing his or her own ends, and full exercise 
of autonomy requires that there be viable options. Even if the 
philosopher fully endorses a homebody existence for himself, 
for the endorsement to be truly meaningful, the “what ifs” 
must be open. It must be the case that if he had chosen to be a 
traveler, he would have been able to do so. This counterfactual 
is significant for an autonomous being. For a non-autonomous 
creature, it is not. Their deepest ends are not reflected upon or 
chosen; they simply are. What matters to them is not choos-
ing between ends, but avoiding frustration in pursuing the ones 
that they do have. The rabbits do not need the option to do 
something they will never want to do. What they need is to be 
allowed to do the things they do, in fact, want to do. 
Cochrane argues that liberty has a merely instrumental 
value for animals, since it allows them to satisfy their desires 
(Cochrane 2009, 674; cf. DeGrazia 1996, 269). It is the abil-
ity to satisfy those desires, not the liberty itself, that has in-
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trinsic value. Liberty has an intrinsic value only for autono-
mous creatures such as human beings. This is why, according 
to Cochrane, it is wrong to deprive a human being of liberty, 
but is not (always) wrong to so deprive an animal. Using the 
previously-introduced distinction between preference liberty 
and autonomous liberty, I would instead put it this way. Prefer-
ence liberty has a value for non-autonomous animals; autono-
mous liberty does not. As the example of the homebody phi-
losopher shows, it is possible to compromise autonomy without 
infringing on preference liberty. Thus human slavery, however 
benign, wrongs human beings; by its nature, it restricts autono-
mous liberty. Pet-keeping is not comparable because autono-
mous liberty has no meaning for most animals, and because 
pet-keeping is, in theory, compatible with preference liberty.
Liberty and Animals
I have used the term “benign slavery” to refer to a state of 
slavery in which the enslaved individual is provided with a very 
pleasant life free of suffering and want. Such slavery could, in 
theory, be consistent with having a great deal of preference lib-
erty. If the enslaved is not significantly hindered in the pursuit 
of her desires – because she is happy with her lot, and desires 
nothing else – then she is like the penned-in philosopher: al-
though other options have been closed for her, they are options 
she is not interested in pursuing.
One may object that such a state of affairs is inconceivable, 
because someone will always have a desire for freedom even if 
all of her more worldly desires are met. I am not convinced this 
is true. In the case of human beings, cultural conditioning, a 
Brave New World situation, could conceivably result in people 
who do not yearn for freedom at all. Even if it is true of human 
beings, however, it is likely not true of animals. An animal may 
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wish to escape from a cage, but it is because the cage is inter-
fering with pursuing some object of her desire, not because she 
desires freedom as such. As human beings, we resent the clos-
ing off of options in our lives even if we did not desire them 
because it interferes with our autonomy. Non-autonomous ani-
mals are unconcerned with such abstract harms. So if the con-
cept of slavery applies at all to animals, benign slavery would 
be a possibility for them.
I conclude, however, that the concept of slavery does not ap-
ply to the kinds of animals that we keep as pets. The essence of 
slavery is not the restriction of preference liberty; it is the re-
striction of autonomous liberty. This can be seen from the fact 
that benign slavery is still a great wrong to human beings. For a 
human being to be controlled by another harms her even if she 
does not wish to leave. It harms her because if she had wanted 
to leave that life, she would not have been able to. It wrongs her 
in the way that we wrong the homebody philosopher by pen-
ning him in to his home town. It violates her autonomy even 
if the life dictated for her is perfectly in line with the choices 
she would make for herself. A non-autonomous animal is not 
subject to such a violation. Pet animals can be, and are, harmed 
in many ways, and our treatment of them is often abominable. 
They may be our victims, but they are not slaves.
Even though pets cannot have their autonomy compromised, 
it is true that their preference liberty is almost always restricted 
to some degree. Indeed, the very concept of pet-keeping may 
require it; it is difficult to imagine an animal whose liberty 
is never restricted at all but who could still be characterized 
as a pet. When we restrict a pet’s liberty it is ideally for the 
animal’s own good: keeping a dog from running into the street 
and being hit by a car, or forcing a cat to receive a vaccination. 
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Burgess-Jackson (1998, 182-83) argues that paternalism and at-
tendant restrictions of liberty are justified on the same grounds 
that paternalism toward one’s children is justified. There is a 
significant disanalogy: children will one day fledge, and ani-
mal companions will remain forever within our control. 
What justifies our continuing to limit pets’ liberty, but not 
our adult offsprings’, is that the pets will never achieve auton-
omy, and the children most likely will. Preference liberty has 
an instrumental value for animals: it is valuable because it al-
lows them to pursue their well-being. If an animals’ well-being 
can be improved with some restrictions of liberty, then this is 
justified. For an adult human being, a restriction of liberty for 
the sake of well-being is typically not justified because of the 
restriction of autonomy that it also causes.
Further Questions and Conclusion
Although the keeping of companion animals is not intrin-
sically wrong in the way that enslavement of human beings 
is wrong, there are significant ethical problems with the way 
it is currently practiced. Many restrictions of liberty imposed 
on pets are not done for the animal’s own good but only for 
the pet-keeper’s. They are often treated with a very low regard 
for their well-being. It remains an open question whether pet-
keeping should be abolished, not because it is akin to slavery, 
but because the state of affairs that renders it largely unethical 
today is unlikely to change significantly. The morally accept-
able pet-human relationship may be practically impossible to 
achieve in a widespread way. 
If pet-keeping is an institution worth perpetuating, then 
further questions persist. What animals should we take in as 
pets? Burgess-Jackson regards making wild animals into pets 
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as more questionable than domesticated breeds (1998, 162), but 
an argument for the moral significance of domestication would 
be required. I am inclined to suggest that the significance of 
domestication is simply that it facilitates keeping animals with 
minimal restrictions of preference liberty. A domestic animal’s 
desires are more easily satisfied in the domestic environment 
than a wild animal’s. The moral permissibility of keeping a 
given animal is dependent on whether that species’s needs can 
be well met in captivity with minimal infringement of prefer-
ence liberty. This also hints at the further applicability of my 
argument to zoos.
What about domestication itself? The argument I have pre-
sented makes no claim about the process of domestication; in-
stead I have sought only to evaluate the human relationship 
with existing domestic animals. It could well be argued that we 
ought not domesticate any more species, especially as the pro-
cess of domestication must start somewhere, and the earliest 
generations will still be wild animals and correspondingly ill-
suited to the domestic life. For dogs, cats, and other common 
pets, that ship sailed long ago. 
Finally, we must determine how to characterize the pet-
human relationship. Hens, after rejecting master-slave as a 
good model for the ideal pet-human relationship, considers 
employer-employee, parent-child, and friend-friend, and finds 
them all wanting, though with elements of truth to each. I have 
used “pet” and “pet-keeper” throughout this essay in order to 
remain neutral, especially as I sometimes discussed less than 
ideal relationships. For an ideal relationship, “companion ani-
mal,” as it is now well recognized and avoids the ownership 
implications of “pet,” is perhaps the best we can do. The idea 
that an animal is owned in the same way property is owned 
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is unjust and should be changed. Some kind of guardianship 
model would probably better account for the obligations we 
have to act in our pet’s interests and not just our own.
Those who regard pet-keeping as nothing less than slavery 
have made a mistake; they have conflated preference liberty 
and autonomous liberty. But those, especially in the general 
public, who regard it as plainly morally unproblematic have 
made a worse mistake. The current practice is a long way from 
the ideal conditions that make pet-keeping theoretically accept-
able. 
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